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RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN RUSSIA: HELP OR HINDRANCE TO 
DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY? ROMAN CATHOLICS 
 
by Daniel L. Schlafly, Jr. 
Daniel L. Schlafly, Jr. is Professor of Russian History at St. Louis 
University, St. Louis Missouri. He has published extensively on 19th 
century Russian history. This paper was presented at a panel on 
Religious Minorities in Russia, during the joint sessions of the 
American Society of Church History and the American Catholic 
Historical Association, April 28-30, 2000 in Santa Fe, New Mexico 
 
The greatest obstacle to civil society in today's Russia is its long tradition of 
state supervision and control, embodied both in the actions of government bodies and 
the attitudes of Russian citizens. Religious entities face particular challenges in this 
area. In 1991, the Soviet Union and the Russian Republic revoked the punitive 1918 
and 1929 laws on religion, granting religious organizations1 a wide variety of rights, 
including status as judicial persons, but reiterated the obligation to obtain official 
registration.2 Article 14.1 of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation stated 
that "religious associations (ob’edineniia) are separated from the state and equal 
before the law."3 It was not until the "Law of the Russian Federation on the Freedom 
of Conscience and Religious Associations" was signed by Boris Yeltsin on September 
26, 1997, however, that these associations' precise status was defined.4  
                                                 
1The Soviet law used the term "religious organizations,"  while the Russian Republic referred to 
"religious unions." 
2For the texts of the 1991 laws, see La Documentation Catholique 2023 (3 March 1991): 228-39. 
3Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: INFRA.M---NORMA, 1997), 7. 
4For the text, see La Documentation Catholique, 2176 (15 February 1998): 179-87. 
The 1997 law recognized "the special role of Orthodoxy in the history of 
Russia,"5 but attempts to give special status to four "traditional" religions of Russia--
Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism--were rejected after protests from many 
quarters, including Pope John Paul II.6 While individuals and unregistered religious 
"groups" were guaranteed freedom of religion, only "religious associations" were 
granted full legal rights, to be exercised only after formal registration, a complex and 
lengthy process.7 Thus, like its predecessors, the Russian Federation continues to 
demand a special, albeit somewhat reduced, role for the state in religious affairs.  
Another obstacle to the participation of religious bodies in civil society is 
what Professor A. YU. Grigorenko of the Herzen Pedagogical University recently 
called "the conflation of national and confessional self-identification."8 Hence, on all 
levels the Russian Orthodox Church is accorded a special role, not so much in its 
spiritual capacity, but instead as the unique incarnation of national, cultural, and 
political values. The presence of Patriarch Aleksii II at Yeltsin's December 31, 1999 
surprise resignation, government support for the rebuilding of the Cathedral of Christ 
the Savior, or recent proposals to base religious education in state schools on 
Orthodox theology are but three recent examples. Other faiths also are viewed 
through a national lens, as when Fr. Vsevolod Chaplin, of the Moscow Patriarchate"s 
Department of External Church Relations, recently referred to "national religious 
communities."9
                                                 
5Ibid, 179. 
6Text of his 24 June 1997 letter to Boris Yeltsin in La Documentation Catholique, 2167 (5 October 
1997): 804. 
7On March 26, 2000, Vladimir Putin signed a law extending the deadline for registration until 
December 31, 2000 after widespread failure to meet the previous deadline of December 31, 1999. For 
a description of the registration hurdles faced by the Catholic parish in Samara, see Tatyana Titova, 
"Registration in Samara Region: Civic Code Versus Canon Law," Keston News Service (November 17, 
1999): 1-9. 
8Andrei YUr'eviia Grigorenko, ""Religiia, obshchestvo, gosudarstvo v sovremennoi Rossii: nekotoryie 
aspekty problemy," in Religioznyie organizatiii i gosudarstvo: perspektivy vzaimodeistviia: materialy 
konferentsii: Moskva, 22-23 fevraliia 1999 goda (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Rudomino", 1999), 27. 
9Vsevolod Chaplin, "Tserkovno-gosudarstvennyie otnosheniia v svete pozitsii Sviashchennonachaliia 
Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi," in ibid, 23. 
It is not surprising, then, that any attempt by the Roman Catholic Church to 
play a role in Russian civil society is burdened by negative historical and national 
associations. All Orthodox share a perception of Catholic Western aggression, 
exemplified in the Fourth Crusade's sack of Constantinople in 1204. The Russian 
Orthodox Church and the nation as a whole continue to celebrate the successful 
defense of the Russian land, people, and faith against Swedes and Teutonic Knights 
in the thirteenth century, the Union of Brest in the sixteenth century, the Polish 
occupation of Moscow in the seventeenth century, and by extension, invasions by 
Napoleon in the nineteenth and Hitler in the twentieth centuries.10 Prominent shrines 
and monuments are powerful visible reminders of past incursions by the Latin West 
and reinforce the need for continued vigilance; for example, the Aleksandr Nevskii 
Lavra and the Kazan and St. Isaac's Cathedrals in St. Petersburg; the rebuilt Cathedral 
of Christ the Savior and the grandiose new World War II memorial, including a 
chapel, in Moscow; and plaques, shrines, and exhibits in the Holy Trinity-St. Sergius, 
Tolga, and Kirillo-Belozersk Monasteries. 
The negative image of Roman aggression inherited from tsarist times was 
given a new slant during the Soviet era, when the Roman Catholic Church was 
portrayed as the agent of Wall Street and Western imperialism in a concerted 
campaign against the Soviet Union and the Russian Orthodox Church, whose leaders 
both seconded official propaganda and participated in the suppression of Uniate 
churches in western Ukraine and Belarus. Nevertheless, since tsarist times, the state, 
the Russian Orthodox Church, and popular opinion has accorded the Roman Catholic 
Church a limited role in ministering to historically Catholic minorities on Russian 
soil, such as foreigners in major cites, Volga Germans, or Poles and Lithuanians. Too, 
there were ecumenical contacts between Orthodox émigrés and Roman Catholics in 
the 1920's and 1930's and between dissidents of various faiths in the Soviet Union 
since the 1960's. Khrushchev's permission for the Russian Orthodox Church to reach 
                                                 
10For a fuller treatment of this legacy, see my "Roman Catholicism in Today's Russia: The Troubled 
Heritage," Journal of Church and State 39 (Autumn 1997): 681-96, and the works cited there. For the 
Soviet period, also see Roman Solchanyk and Ivan Hvat, "The Catholic Church in the Soviet Union, in 
Catholics and Politics in Communist Societies, ed. Pedro Ramet (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 1990), 49-92 and Constantin Simon, "How Russians See Us: Jesuit-Russian Relations Then and 
Now," Religion, State & Society 23, No. 4 (1995): 343-57. 
out to the West, including Catholics, and the Catholic commitment to dialogue with 
other churches begun by Pope John XXIII also boded well for friendly relations in the 
future. 
The new freedom for religion in Russia since perestroika has enabled the 
Roman Catholic Church there to play a role impossible to imagine in Soviet times 
when it had but two parishes. After Gorbachev's December 1989 reception by Pope 
John Paul II, diplomatic relations were established between the Vatican and the 
Soviet Union.11 In 1991, apostolic administrators were installed in Moscow, 
Novosibirsk, and Karaganda (now in the independent nation of Kazakhstan); that 
same year the Catholic College of St. Thomas was opened in Moscow, where in 1993 
a major seminary also began classes. Two more apostolic administrators, one in 
Saratov and one in Irkutsk, were named in 1999.12 There are now approximately 
1,285,000 Catholics with 327 parishes and 51 mission stations served by 195 priests 
in the Russian Federation.13  These and religious brothers and sisters, plus various 
official and unofficial Catholic organizations, in addition to conducting religious 
services, are engaged in a variety of previously forbidden publishing, education, and 
charitable works. 
                                                 
11Solchanyk and Hvat, "The Catholic Church in the Soviet Union , 89. 
12Apostolic administrations are groups of the faithful which "for special and particularly serious 
reasons are not erected as dioceses." Annuario Pontificio, (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vatican, 
2000), 1924. The archbishop and bishops responsible for the Catholic Church in Russia have been 
named to titular sees rather than the cities in which they actually live and work to avoid the appearance 
of creating a parallel hierarchy to the Russian Orthodox Church. But Orthodox still have been quick to 
see their presence as evidence of Roman proselytism. 
13Figures in ibid, passim. 
In the formation of a civil society, the Catholic Church in Russia benefits, not 
just from personnel and resources from abroad but also from Roman Catholicism's 
long and successful experience of evangelization and survival in a variety of cultures. 
The Russian Catholic clergy and hierarchy are well-trained and well-educated, until 
very recently all products of established seminaries abroad. The new institutions in 
Russia are staffed by capable foreign professors and also maintain high educational 
standards. This is in sharp contrast to the often rigid and anti-intellectual Russian 
Orthodox institutions,14 not to mention the many overzealous and unprepared 
Protestant evangelists active in Russia. Too, Catholicism can draw on a body of 
theological thought and social teaching to deal with contemporary issues Orthodoxy 
had no chance to develop in Russia and few Protestants can match. For example, 
articles in the Russian Catholic newspaper Svet Evangeliia relied heavily on the papal 
encyclicals Gaudiam et Spes and Centesimo Anno to analyze the 1996 presidential 
election from a Christian perspective without endorsing particular parties or 
candidates.15 In addition, Catholics are admired for charitable institutions that meet 
pressing social needs without overt religious content; for example, in 1996, Salesians 
staffing the Catholic Church of the Immaculate Conception in Moscow opened a 
children's shelter nearby.16
This success has awakened old fears of Catholic aggrandizement, however, 
particularly since the Church in Russia has introduced more Russian language 
liturgies to reach the increasingly assimilated Polish, German, and other historically 
Catholic foreign communities.17 Even more controversial has been the Church's 
willingness to accept as converts secularized, usually unbaptized, Russians, although 
their numbers remain quite small. As early as 1991, Archimandrite Iosif Pustoutov, 
for many years responsible for the Moscow Patriarchate's relations with the Catholic 
                                                 
14See the gloomy picture of Russian Orthodox seminaries painted by Hieromonk Hilarion Alfeyev of 
the Moscow Patriarchate's Department for External Church Affairs, "The Problems Facing Orthodox 
Theological Education in Russia," Report delivered at the consultation of Orthodox theological schools 
held in Belgrade, Serbia, from 16-24 August 1997, [published in REE, XIX, 1 (February 1999).] 
15Svet Evangeliia, 9 June 1996, 5-6. 
16Felix Corley, "Catholic Shelter Works with Vulnerable Children in Moscow," Keston News Service 
(22 January 2000): 4-9. 
17The first Catholic Mass in Russian at the Church of Saint-Louis des Français in Moscow was 
celebrated 24 February 1991.  Yuli Shreider, "Russian Catholicism," Religion, State & Society 24 
(1996): 57. Shreider is one of the new Russian converts. 
Church, expressed his "bitterness" that Catholics as well as other groups were giving 
the Russian Orthodox Church "very severe competition in the missionary field" and 
charged that the new Catholic hierarchy had been established "with no other goal than 
to create the conditions for future proselytism."18
                                                 
18Intervention at the Fifth Joint Session of the Conference of European Churches and Council of the 
Conference of European Bishops held at Santiago da Campostella, 12-18 November 1991. Quoted in 
La Documentation Catholique 2041 (5 January 1992): 24-25. 
Thus, the Roman Catholic church's role in any Russian civil society continues 
to be burdened by association with past Western aggression and its image as a 
foreign, not a Russian, church; last year, Patriarch Aleksii II even was reported to 
have said that the only Catholics in Russia were diplomats in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg.19  Moreover, the Catholic population is small and scattered, still heavily 
dependent on foreign personnel, many Polish, with ethnic tensions among its 
multinational flock.20 And while the Russian Orthodox Church faces its own 
problems, it still is regarded, officially and unofficially, as the Russian church, and 
Catholics, like other non-Orthodox faiths, are expected to acknowledge its primacy. 
Too, Catholicism and all other religions in Russia must deal with the legacy of 
seventy years of official atheism and  with the perhaps equally antireligious 
contemporary challenge of consumerism and materialism.  
Finally, as part of a worldwide institution, the Catholic Church in Russia must 
conform to the broader goals of the Vatican, in this case Pope John Paul II's 
continuing effort to foster friendly relations with the Orthodox Churches in hopes of 
eventual reunion. In contrast to Uniates in the Western borderlands, Latin rite 
Catholics in Russia are only too aware of their marginal status and not inclined to 
press their case too vigorously. Such ecumenical concerns have restricted the local 
church somewhat, as in its lack of a regular diocesan structure. 
The past history and current situation of the Roman Catholic Church in Russia 
offer little hope that it can play a major role in Russian civil society, aside from the 
question whether there will be a functioning civil society in the foreseeable future. 
The Church is too small and too scattered to have a strong presence, either locally or 
nationally. It has never shaken the official and unofficial image of Roman 
Catholicism as a foreign and potentially dangerous entity, even though it has never 
attracted more than occasional Russian converts. As recently as January 2000, a 
decree signed by then Acting President Vladimir Putin enacted a "National Security 
Concept" which cited "cultural-religious expansion of neighbouring states into 
                                                 
19Lawrence Uzzell, "Letter from Moscow," in First Things (May 1999): 16. 
20Simon, "How Russians See Us," 354. 
Russian territory" as a threat and called for "the counteraction of the negative 
influence of foreign religious organisations and missionaries."21
                                                 
21Quoted in Geraldine Fagan, "Who Will Fight for Religious Freedom in Russia's New Duma?," 
Keston News Service (24 January 2000): 3. 
Yet the small band of Latin rite Russian Catholics, a minority in a minority 
church, are convinced they have a role to play, in the words of one them, "as a 
community of Russians who are enriching Russian culture with a experience it 
lacks."22 Whether Russia can develop a civil society willing to listen to them is 
another question. 
                                                 
22Shrieder, “Russian Catholicism," 58. 
 
